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ABSTRACT
We present a quantitative lower bound on the number of
vulnerable embedded device on a global scale. Over the
past year, we have systematically scanned large portions of
the internet to monitor the presence of trivially vulnerable
embedded devices. At the time of writing, we have iden-
tified over 540,000 publicly accessible embedded devices
configured with factory default root passwords. This consti-
tutes over 13% of all discovered embedded devices.These de-
vices range from enterprise equipment such as firewalls and
routers to consumer appliances such as VoIP adapters, cable
and IPTV boxes to office equipment such as network print-
ers and video conferencing units. Vulnerable devices were
detected in 144 countries, across 17,427 unique private
enterprise, ISP, government, educational, satellite provider
as well as residential network environments. Preliminary re-
sults from our longitudinal study tracking over 102,000 vul-
nerable devices revealed that over 96% of such accessible
devices remain vulnerable after a 4-month period. We be-
lieve the data presented in this paper provides a conservative
lower bound on the actual population of vulnerable devices
in the wild. By combining the observed vulnerability dis-
tributions and its potential root causes, we propose a set of
mitigation strategies and hypothesize about its quantitative
impact on reducing the global vulnerable embedded device
population. Employing our strategy, we have partnered with
Team Cymru to engage key organizations capable of signifi-
cantly reducing the number of trivially vulnerable embedded
devices currently on the internet. As an ongoing longitudi-
nal study, we plan to gather data continuously over the next
year in order to quantify the effectiveness of community’s
cumulative effort to mitigate this pervasive threat.
1. INTRODUCTION
Embedded network devices have become an ubiquitous
fixture in the modern home, office as well as in the global
communication infrastructure. Routers, NAS appliances,
home entertainment appliances, wireless access points, web
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cams, VoIP appliances, print servers and video conferencing
units reside on the same networks as our personal comput-
ers and enterprise servers and together form our world-wide
communication infrastructure. Widely deployed and often
misconfigured, embedded network devices constitute highly
attractive targets for exploitation.
Although common wisdom enforces the suspicion that em-
bedded devices tend to be less secure then general purpose
computers and often trivial to exploit, evidence of such in-
securities is mostly anecdotal. To fully appreciate the scope
and scale of the embedded threat, we must move beyond
analysis of individual embedded devices and their vulner-
abilities. In order to formulate realistic and effective mit-
igation strategies against current and next generation em-
bedded device exploitation, we first pose and answer several
fundamental questions:
– How have embedded devices been exploited in the past?
How feasible is large scale exploitation of embedded
devices? (Section 2)
– How can we quantitatively measure the level of em-
bedded device insecurity on a global scale? (Section
3)
– How can compromised embedded devices be used to
benefit malicious attackers? (Section 4)
– How many vulnerable embedded devices are there in
the world? What are they? Where are they? (Section
5)
– What are the most efficient methods of securing vul-
nerable embedded devices? (Section 6)
The purpose of our project is to quantify and trend the
level of insecurity of embedded devices currently in the wild.
To this end, we first establish an observed lower bound on
the number of trivially vulnerable embedded devices on the
internet. We do this by assuming the role of the least so-
phisticated malicious attacker (See Section 3.1), who only
tries to log into publicly reachable embedded devices us-
ing well known default root credentials. Section 3 de-
scribes the default credential scanner we developed using
standard tools such as nmap, which positively identified
over 540,000 wide open embedded devices.
Vulnerable devices were detected in 144 countries, in
enterprise, ISP, government, educational, satellite provider
as well as residential network environments1. We discov-
1Military networks are intentionally excluded from our scan,
although a collaborative effort is currently underway to carry









3,223,358,720 3,912,574 540,435 13.81%
Table 1: Scale and Result of the Latest Global De-
fault Credential Scan.
ered vulnerable devices across a diverse spectrum of prod-
uct types, including consumer appliances, home networking
devices, office appliances, enterprise and carrier network-
ing equipment, data-center power management devices, net-
work security appliances, server lights-out-management con-
trollers, IP camera surveillance systems, VoIP devices, video
conferencing appliances as well as ISP issued modems and
set-top boxes. Section 5 presents detailed analysis of the
data collected by our default credential scanner.
Figure 1: Distribution of Vulnerable Embedded De-
vices in IPv4 Space. Total Number of Vulnerable
Devices Found: 540,435.
While the observed quantity and distribution of embedded
devices configured with default root passwords demonstrate
a global, pervasive phenomenon, we believe the data pre-
sented in this paper represent a conservative lower bound
on the actual population of vulnerable devices in the wild.
Evidence suggests that this lower bound can be raised sig-
nificantly by slightly escalating the level of sophistication of
our assumed attacker [11].
1.1 Contributions
We present the first quantitative measurement of embed-
ded device insecurity on a global scale, along with prelimi-
nary results from an ongoing longitudinal study of the same
subject. By assuming the role of the least sophisticated
attacker (see Section 3.1), we present an observed lower
bound on the distribution of trivially exploitable network
embedded devices over functional (Section 5.1), spatial (Sec-
tion 5.2), organizational (Section 5.3) and temporal (Section
5.5) domains.
The embedded device default credential scanner created
for this experiment is designed to identify efficiently and
safely the vulnerable embedded devices on the network. It
does this by testing whether one can remotely login into a
device using well known default root credentials. The veri-
fication process is designed to use minimal resources on the
target embedded device. The scanner currently supports
73 unique embedded device types including consumer appli-
ances, home networking devices, office appliances, enterprise
and carrier networking equipment, data-center power man-
agement devices, network security appliances, server lights-
out-management controllers, IP camera surveillance systems,
VoIP devices, video conferencing appliances as well as ISP
issued modems and set-top boxes.
While the embedded security threat has been generally
known for some time, the data presented in this paper pro-
vides a real-world quantitative assessment of the scale and
scope of the embedded threat on a global level. Analy-
sis of our results yields several interesting features within
the observed vulnerability distributions. The features pre-
sented in Section 5 presents insights into the root causes of
the existence of vulnerable embedded devices. By combin-
ing the observed vulnerability distributions and its potential
root causes, we formulate a set of mitigation strategies and
hypothesize about its quantitative impact on reducing the
global vulnerable device population.
Many forces will undoubtably change the observable lower
bound of embedded device insecurity as time goes on. For
example, the out-of-the-box security of new embedded prod-
ucts may change. Network operators controlling large homo-
geneous sets of devices may improve their security, as may
small and medium size organizations like private enterprises
and educational organizations. The level of malicious ex-
ploitation will also indirectly contribute to the overall effort
dedicated to improving embedded device security. Lastly,
it is our hope that the data and mitigation strategies re-
ported in this paper will generate more awareness of this
pervasive threat. In order to quantify the scope of the em-
bedded device insecurity threat over time and detect such
forces at work, we plan to continue our scanning activities
to conduct an ongoing longitudinal study over the next year.
Section 5.5 discusses the preliminary results of our longitu-
dinal study over the past four months.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 surveys recent developments related to embedded de-
vice insecurity in white-hat and black-hat communities as
well as popular literature. Section 3 describes our method-
ology with emphasis on the steps taken to ensure a safe and
ethical experimental protocol. Section 4 describes a variety
of novel malicious uses of the vulnerable devices discovered
by our scanner. Section 5 presents the analysis of data gath-
ered from our latest global scan as well as preliminary results
from our ongoing longitudinal study. Section 6 presents a
set of remediation strategies, along with an quantitative es-
timates of its potential effect with respect to the global vul-
nerable device population. We conclude in Section 7 with a
summary of our contributions.
2. RELATED WORKS
Evidence of embedded device insecurity and exploitation
has been presented in both white-hat and black-hat venues
for quite some time. The creation and propagation charac-
teristics of hypothetical malnets exploiting vulnerable wire-
less routers have been described by several researchers [10,
19]. For example, Traynor et al. showed that an adversary
can potentially compromise over 24,000 routers in Manhat-
tan in less than 2 hours [19]. The data from our scan in-
dicates that trivially exploitable embedded devices exist in
sufficient quantity and concentration for such hypothetical
attacks to be feasible. Our data also corroborates that phish-
ing attacks using compromised consumer electronics such as
home routers [20] can be carried out on a large scale by
technically unsophisticated attackers.
Existing evidence clearly reenforces the common wisdom
that embedded devices are generally less secure then general
purpose computers and are often trivial to exploit. However,
the available literature tends to focus on specific vulnerabil-
ities or vulnerable devices.
For example, a recent Wired.com article [9] announced
a vulnerability found on the administrative interface of the
SMC8014 series cable modem, potentially affecting 65,000
Time Warner customers. Numerous research projects [18,
11] targeting specific device types have demonstrated that
large numbers of vulnerabilities within ubiquitous embed-
ded device types. According to Bojinov et al., an audit of
common embedded administrative interfaces from 16 major
manufacturers yielded significant vulnerabilities from all of
the 21 devices considered [11].
The evolution of embedded device exploitation tools and
techniques demonstrate an accelerating maturation of ma-
licious attacks against embedded devices. While proof of
concept Cisco IOS exploits and shellcode have been publicly
available since 2003 [13, 16], recent evidence suggests that
attackers are scanning for and exploiting consumer routers
to build modest size bot-nets, mainly for DDOS purposes.
The appearance of tutorials [5] and simple to use tools to
find and control specific consumer routers indicate that em-
bedded device exploitation techniques are beginning to dif-
fuse out of research circles, and into the general black-hat
community.
To the best of our knowledge, the first consumer router
botnet, psyb0t, was reported by Dronebl.org in 2008 [6].
While no detailed analysis of the bot was published, we
do know that it primarily targeted mipsel OpenWRT and
DD-WRT devices using default passwords. It is suspected
that the psyb0t botnet observed in 2008 was a proof of con-
cept test of the technology [7], as the botnet was quickly
shutdown by its operators following Dronebl.org’s public an-
nouncement of its existence.
The current generation of embedded device malcode may
be related to existing unix tools like Kaiten.c [1]. A sur-
vey of black hat literature circa 2008 shows at least one
document describing the process of compromising similar
consumer routers using password guessing and existing unix
IRC bots [5]. This may help to explain why the majority
of victim embedded devices exploited thus far have been
unix-based consumer routers. For example, psyb0t targeted
only home routers and heavily leveraged the unix-like oper-
ating environment found on its victim devices. Specifically,
psyb0t used commands like wget and chmod to download
its payload onto victim devices and used iptables to block
all administrative interfaces to protect the device from other
attackers.
2.1 Next Generation Embedded Malcode
Existing embedded device malcode such as psyb0t de-
pend heavily on its victim devices’ similarity to traditional
unix systems. While development of such malcode is rela-
tively straightforward, it constrains the vulnerable popula-
tion to low-end consumer appliances running unix-like oper-
ating systems. For example, enterprise networking devices
like Cisco routers and switches run on proprietary operat-
ing systems like IOS, which do not resemble traditional unix
architecture. However, recent advancements in exploitation
and root-kitting techniques for proprietary operating sys-
tems like Cisco IOS [17, 14] could allow attackers to com-
promise high-end enterprise devices like backbone routers
and firewalls. It is highly likely that the next generation of
embedded device malcode will have greater ability to com-
promise heterogeneous device types, stealthier and more so-
phisticated command and control channels, as well as other
malicious capabilities aside from DDOS.
Furthermore, as data presented in Section 5 suggest, the
current population of trivially vulnerable embedded devices
is quite high. Therefore, the next generation of malcode ca-
pable of compromising heterogeneous device types will easily
be able to infect significantly more devices then psyb0t and
kaiten.c in their current state.
3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The default credential scanner is designed to quickly sweep
large portions of the internet. Each scan takes approxi-
mately four weeks and involves two or three sweeps of the
entire monitored IP space (Section 3.4 discusses how the
monitored IP ranges are selected.)
Multiple sweeps across the same IP space is desirable for
two reasons. First, embedded devices on residential net-
works have unpredictable availability. Therefore, multiple
sweeps increase the scanner’s probability of observing a vul-
nerable device when it is connected to the network. Second,
multiple sweeps across the same address space over months
and years allow us to conduct a longitudinal study on the
vulnerability rates of embedded devices around the world.
In Section 5, we present the results of our latest scan, con-
taining over 540,000 observed vulnerable devices, as well as
analysis of preliminary data gathered by tracking approxi-
mately 102,000 vulnerable embedded devices over a span of
four months in Section 5. This is an ongoing study, and we
plan to publish the results of a detailed longitudinal study
over the next year when the data becomes available.
3.1 Threat Model
For the sake of establishing a lower bound on the state of
embedded device insecurity in the wild, we assume the role
of the least sophisticated malicious attacker. The attacker
has unrestricted access to the internet but is unable to ex-
ploit any vulnerabilities found on any devices. Instead, the
attacker has access to the network scanner nmap and a list
of well known factory default root credentials for popular
network embedded devices.
For the remainder of the paper, we define a vulnerable
device as any device that is reachable on the internet and




Figure 2: Common Cisco Telnet Login Prompt.
3.2 Default Credential Scanner: A Three Phase
Process
The default credential scan process is straightforward and
can be broken down into three sequential phases: recogni-
zance, identification, and verification.
Recognizance: First, nmap is used to scan large portions
of the internet for open TCP ports 23 and 80. The
results of scan is stored in a SQL database.
Identification: Next, the device identification process con-
nects to all listening Telnet and HTTP servers to re-
trieve the initial output of these servers2. The server
output is stored in a SQL database then matched against
a list of signatures to identify the manufacturer and
model of the device in question (See 3.3).
For example, Figure 2 shows a telnet login prompt
common to Cisco routers and switches.
Verification: Once the manufacturer and model of the de-
vice are positively identified, the verification phase uses
an automated script to attempt to log into devices
found in the identification phase. This script uses only
well known default root credentials for the specific de-
vice model and does not engage in any form of brute
force password guessing. We create a unique device
verification profile for each type of embedded device
we monitor. This profile contains all information nec-
essary for the verification script to automatically ne-
gotiate the authentication process, using either the de-
vice’s Telnet or HTTP administrative interface. Fig-
ure 3.2 shows two typical device verification profiles,
one for the administrative Telnet interface for Cisco
switches and routers, the other for the HTTP adminis-
trative interface for Linksys WRT routers using HTTP
Basic Authentication. Each device verification profile
contains information like the username and password
prompt signatures, default credentials as well as au-
thentication success and failure conditions for the par-
ticular embedded device type. Once the success or
failure of the default credential is verified, the TCP
session is terminated and the results are written to an
encrypted flash drive for off-line analysis. (See 3.5).
2In case of HTTP, we issue the ’get /’ request










Table 2: Key Statistics on the Scope and Geograph-
ical Distribution of the IP Ranges Currently Moni-
tored by the Default Credential Scanner.
3.3 Device Selection
The full list of devices currently monitored by our default
credential scanner can be found on our project webpage3.
In order for an embedded device to be included in this list,
its default root credentials must be well known and obtain-
able through either manufacturer documentation or simple
search engine queries. The default credential scanner does
not engage in any form of brute force password guessing.
The device selection process is manual and iterative. We
begin by analyzing data gathered by the recognizance phase
of our scanner, which collects the initial output from ac-
tive Telnet and HTTP servers found by NMAP. We main-
tain three sets of signatures: non-embedded devices, non-
candidate embedded devices and candidate embedded de-
vices. Signatures of non-embedded devices include those of
popular HTTP servers such as Apache and IIS as well as
Telnet common authentication prompts of general purpose
operating systems. Signatures of non-candidate embedded
devices include those that do not ship with a well known de-
fault credential4. Signatures of candidate embedded devices
include string patterns that positively identify the device as
one that we are actively monitoring. After the recognizance
data is tagged using these three signature sets, we manually
inspect the remaining records, tagging, creating new signa-
tures and device verification profiles.
3.4 Network Range Selection
We initially directed our scan towards the largest ISPs
in North and South America, Europe and Asia. As we it-
eratively refined our scanning infrastructure, we gradually
widened the scope of our scan to include select geographical
locations within the United States. After testing our de-
fault credential scanner for over six months to ensure that it
caused no harm to the scanned networks, we finally allowed
the scanner to operate globally. Using a reverse lookup of
the MaxMind GeoIP database [2], we included every /24 net-
work in the IPv4 space which is associated to a geographical
location. Table 2 shows some key metrics on the scope of
the IP ranges which we currently monitor.
3.5 Ethical Considerations and Due Diligence
The technical methodology of our project is straightfor-
ward. However, the necessary means of gathering real-world
data on the vulnerability rates of embedded device have
raised an ethical debate.
3http://www.hacktory.cs.columbia.edu
4For example, the Polycom VSX 3000 video conferencing
unit uses the device’s serial number as the default password.
On one hand, the simple act of port scanning a remote net-
work across the internet can be construed as a hostile and
malicious attack. On the other hand, we can not move be-
yond vague and anecdotal suspicions of the embedded device
security problem unless we gather large scale, quantitative
evidence of the problem currently in the wild.
As advocated in a recent position paper on the ethics of
security vulnerability research [15], this line of proactive vul-
nerability research serves an important social function and
is neither unethical nor illegal with respect to US
law.
The experimental results contain sensitive information on
a large number of vulnerable devices in the world, some of
which reside in sensitive environments. Therefore it is the
responsibility of the research team to uphold a high stan-
dard for ethical behavior and due diligence when engaging
in such sensitive research. The operating environment must
be isolated and fortified against compromise and data ex-
filtration. Furthermore, each member of the research team
must agree to adhere to a clear experimental protocol to
ensure that no harm is done.
A trivial network scanner can be implemented with little
work. However, using such a scanner openly on a global
scale is irresponsible and ethically unacceptable. Therefore
we have invested a large portion of of energy to create a
secure research environment and a responsible experimental
protocol in order to ensure that our activities cause no harm:
Doing no harm. Bound by the ethics principal of the duty
not to harm, we have taken numerous steps to ensure
that our research activities do not interfere with the
normal operations of the networks we monitor. To
this end, the default credential scanner is designed to
use minimal external resources in order to accurately
verify device vulnerability. We scan target networks
in /24 blocks in non-sequential order in order to min-
imize the number of incoming TCP requests destined
to any individual organization. Detailed activity logs
are kept to ensure that no device or network is un-
necessarily probed multiple times during a single scan.
Overall, non-embedded devices and non-candidate em-
bedded devices will receive at most 6 TCP packets over
a period of several minutes. The scanner’s outbound
packet-rate is policed and monitored in order not to
overwhelm any in-path networking devices. Lastly,
each IP address used by our scanner runs a pubic
webpage describing the intention and methodology of
our project [3]. This page also provides instructions
for permanently opting-out of the scan. (See Table
6). Such requests are monitored by both our research
team as well as the Columbia University NOC, and are
promptly honored without question.
Implementing a secure research environment. The scan
system is contained in a DMZ network behind a Cisco
ASA firewall. Scanning nodes are isolated from the
university network. Inbound access to this protected
network can only be established by using IPSec VPN.
Outbound access by the scanning nodes are limited
to the ports which they are scanning (Telnet, HTTP,
etc).
Compartmentalization of access to sensitive information.
VPN access to the scan system DMZ is granted only
to active members of the research team. New students
participating in research are first given access to a sep-
arate DMZ containing a development copy of the scan
system with no sensitive data. Access to the produc-
tion environment is given to students only after they
have acknowledged and demonstrated understanding
of the experimental protocol.
Proper handling of sensitive data at rest. Sensitive ex-
perimental data is purged from the production database
regularly, then transferred to an IronKey [4] USB stick
for encrypted oﬄine storage. This is done to minimize
the amount of data available for exfiltration in case of
a compromise of the research environment.
Notifications of vulnerabilities through trusted channels.
Significant vulnerabilities are reported to Team Cymru,
who brokers communications between our research team
and the appropriate contacts. Sensitive information
detailing the vulnerable devices is either physically handed
off to Team Cmyru members or transferred using en-
crypted channels.
4. MALICIOUS POTENTIAL OF EMBED-
DED DEVICE EXPLOITATION
This section discusses several novel ways of exploiting vul-
nerable embedded devices due to their unique functions and
hardware capabilities. After auditing the functional capabil-
ities of many different embedded devices, we have concluded
that the attacks described below are trivially possible among
a majority of embedded devices within the appropriate func-
tional categories. All attacks discussed below can be carried
out through legitimate manipulation of the administrative
interface. More importantly, as the data presented in Sec-
tion 5 illustrate quantitatively, there exists a large popula-
tion of embedded devices vulnerable to each of the attacks
discussed below. Although DDOS attacks using embedded
devices have certainly been carried out on a relatively large
scale, most of the other attacks described in this section have
not. However, considering the data presented in Section 5,
we posit that it is only a matter of time before such attacks
are carried out systematically on a large scale.
We have engaged several major organizations to mitigate
some of the issues discussed below. Therefore, specific de-
tails regarding organization names and device model infor-
mation are withheld when appropriate.
4.1 Massive DDOS Potential
The heterogeneous nature of embedded administrative in-
terfaces makes orchestrating large DDOS attacks using em-
bedded devices a logistic challenge. Vulnerable embedded
devices clearly exist in large numbers in the wild. However,
it is often believed that embedded operating systems are
too diverse; and capturing the long tail of this diversity is
required to carry out large scale exploitation. Data gathered
by our default credential scanner reveal that many large vul-
nerable homogenous device groups exist in the wild. In fact,
the top 3 most vulnerable device types represent over 55%
of all vulnerable devices discovered by our latest scan. In
other words, there exists at least 300,000 vulnerable embed-
ded devices which can be controlled via 3 similar Telnet-
based administrative interfaces. The exact model of these
three device groups have been anonymized. However, these
three device groups are centrally managed by various service
providers around the world, and thus can be systematically
Figure 3: Distribution of Vulnerable Devices Across
Unique Device Types. The Top 3 Device Types Con-
stitute 55% of the Entire Vulnerable Device Popu-
lation.
secured in a feasible manner. Figure 3 shows the distribu-
tion of the top 12 most frequently encountered vulnerable
embedded device types.
4.2 VoIP Appliance Exploitation
VoIP adapters like the Linksys PAP2, Linksys SPA and
Sipura SPA are consumer appliances, which provide a gate-
way between standard analog telephones and VoIP service
providers. In many cases, the publicly accessible HTTP in-
terface of such devices will display diagnostic information
without requiring any user authentication. This informa-
tion usually includes the name of the customer, their phone
number(s), a log of incoming and outgoing calls, and rel-
evant information regarding the SIP gateway to which the
device is configured to connect. Once authenticated as the
administrative user, an attacker can usually retrieve the cus-
tomer’s SIP credentials, either by exploiting trivial HTTP
vulnerabilities5 or redirecting the victim to a malicious SIP
server.
4.3 Data Leakage via Office Appliance Exploita-
tion
Enterprise printers servers and digital document stations
are ubiquitous in most work environments. According to
our data, network printers also constitute one of the most
vulnerable types of embedded devices. For example, our
default credential scanner identified over 44,000 vulnerable
HP JetDirect Print Servers in 2,505 unique organizations
worldwide. Since high-end print servers and document sta-
tions often have the capability of digitally caching the doc-
uments it processes, we posit that an attacker can use such
devices not only to monitor the flow of internal documents,
but also to exfiltrate them as well.
5Credentials are sometimes displayed in clear-text within
HTML password fields. While this appears to hide the pass-
words in the web browser, it does not hide it in the HTML
source.
4.4 Enterprise Credential Leakage via Acci-
dental Misconfiguration
It is common practice for organizations that operate large
homogenous collections of networking equipment to apply
the same set of administrative credentials to all managed
devices. While this significantly reduces the complexity and
cost of managing a large network, it also puts the network
at risk of total compromise. Using a single master root pass-
word for all networking devices is safe so long as every device
is correctly configured at all times, and the master password
is not leaked. If an enterprise networking device is brought
online with both factory default credentials, as well as the
master credentials of the organization, an attacker can eas-
ily obtain the master root password for the entire network.
While this event is unlikely, the probability of such a mis-
configuration quickly increases with the size and complexity
of the organization, specially when human error is taken into
account. We have not verified that such an attack is feasi-
ble; however, our data indicate that enterprise networking
devices residing within large homogenous environments have
been misconfigured with default root credentials.
5. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Figure 4: Embedded Device Vulnerability Rates of
Monitored Countries (Threshold = 2%).
In this section we present latest data gathered by our de-
fault credential scanner as well as preliminary results from
our ongoing longitudinal study, tracking approximately 102,000
vulnerable devices over a span of four months. We also
present statistics on the level of human and organizational
responses received by Columbia University regarding our
scanning activities. Figure 4 shows a heat map of embedded
device vulnerability rates across monitored countries.
Section 5.1 shows the breakdown of vulnerable embed-
ded devices across 9 functional categories; Enterprise
Devices, VoIP Devices, Home Networking Devices, Cam-
era/Surveillance, Office Appliances, Power Management Con-
trollers, Service Provider Issued Equipment, Video Confer-
encing Units, and Home Brew Devices. Section 5.2 shows
the breakdown of vulnerable embedded devices across 6 con-
tinents. Section 5.3 shows the breakdown of vulnerable de-
vices across 5 types of organizations; Educational, ISP,
Private Enterprise, Government, and Unidentified.
5.1 Breakdown of Vulnerable Devices by Func-
tional Categories
Figure 5: Discovered Candidate Devices (Top) and Vul-
nerable Devices (Bottom) By By Organization Type.
We organized 73 unique embedded device types monitored
by our scan into 9 functional categories. Detailed catego-
rization of monitored devices can be found on our project
webpage6. Figure 5 shows the distribution of all discovered
candidate embedded devices (top) and the distribution of
vulnerable embedded devices (bottom) across the different
functional categories. Table 3 shows the total number can-
didate embedded devices discovered within each functional
category as well as their corresponding vulnerability rate.
– While Service Provider Issued Equipment accounts
for only 35% of all discovered candidate embedded de-
vices, it represents 68% of all vulnerable embedded
devices.
– While Enterprise Networking Equipment accounts
for 43% of all discovered candidate embedded devices,
it only represents 6% of all vulnerable embedded de-
vices.
6http://www.hacktory.cs.columbia.edu
5.2 Breakdown of Vulnerable Devices by Ge-
ographical Location
Figure 6: Discovered Candidate Devices (Top) and Vul-
nerable Devices (Bottom) By Geographical Distribution.
Using the MaxMind GeoIP database[2], we categorized all
discovered candidate and vulnerable embedded devices ac-
cording to the continent in which they are located. Figure
6 shows the distribution of all discovered embedded devices
(top) and the distribution of vulnerable embedded devices
(bottom) across 6 continents. Table 4 shows the total num-
ber of candidate embedded devices as well as the correspond-
ing vulnerability rate within each continent.
– Asia represents the continent with the most number
of candidate embedded devices and accounts for ap-
proximately 80% of all discovered vulnerable embed-
ded devices.
– South Korea contains the largest number vulnerable
embedded devices out of all monitored nations.
– While 33% of all discovered candidate embedded de-
vices reside within North America, only 12% of all
vulnerable embedded devices are found there.
5.3 Breakdown of Vulnerable Devices by Or-
ganizational Categories
Figure 7: Discovered Candidate Devices (Top) and Vul-
nerable Devices (Bottom) By By Organization Type.
Using the MaxMind GeoIP Organization database[2], we
categorized all monitored network ranges into 17,427 indi-
vidual organizations. This was then divided into 4 general
organization types; Educational, Internet Service Provider
(ISP), Private Enterprise, and Government. 9118 organi-
zations could not be accurately classified, and were left in
Unidentified category. Figure 7 shows the distribution of all
discovered embedded devices (top) and the distribution of
vulnerable embedded devices (bottom) across the 5 organi-
zation types. Table 5 shows the total number of candidate
embedded devices as well as the corresponding vulnerability
rate within each organization type.
– ISP networks contain the most number of candidate
embedded devices and house over 68% of all discovered
vulnerable embedded devices.
– While Educational networks contain only a modest
number of candidate embedded devices, it has the high-
est per category vulnerability rate of 32.83%
Vul. Rate Total Devices
Enterprise Devices 2.03% 1,689,245
VoIP Devices 15.34% 104,827
Home Networking 7.70% 445,147
Camera/Surveillance 39.72% 5,080
Office Appliances 41.19% 132,991
Power Management 7.23% 7,429
Service Provider Issued 27.02% 1,362,347
Video Conferencing 55.44% 43,349
Home Brew 4.93% 122,159
Table 3: Vulnerability Rate by Device Category.




North America 4.12% 1,335,575
South America 0.37% 402,163
Oceania 17.98% 85,941
Table 4: Total Discovered Candidate Embedded De-







Educational 1,371 32.83% 156,992
ISP 2,374 17.43% 2,095,292
Priv. Enterprise 4,070 16.40% 554,101
Government 494 10.38% 44,460
Unidentified 9,118 2.54% 1,103,775
Table 5: Vulnerability Rate By Organization Type.
5.4 Community Response to Default Creden-
tial Scanner Activity
The default credential scanner is designed to direct inter-
ested parties to a public webpage which describes the intent
and methodology of our project[3]. Each IP address used by
the scanner also hosts a public HTTP server which redirects
visitors to the public project webpage. We tracked access
to this webpage using Google Analytics as a way to gauge
the global community’s awareness of our scanning activities.
Figure 8 shows the number and geographical distribution of
visitors over the past six months. The initial spike of visitors
in October 2009 coincided with the publication of an article
regarding preliminary results of our project [8]. Since then,
our continuous scanning activity attracted 87 visitors over











Table 6: Email Correspondences Received from Net-
work Operators Regarding Scanning Activity.
Figure 8: Daily Page Access Analytics For Scan Project Information Page [www.hacktory.cs.columbia.edu].
Oct 19, 2009 - April 12, 2010.
Vulnerable Devices Tracked 102,896
Tracked Devices Currently Online 54,429
Tracked Devices Currently Vulnerable 52,661
Table 7: Preliminary Longitudinal Study Tracking
102,896 Vulnerable Devices Over 4 Months.
Table 6 shows a breakdown of all communications between
the operators of the networks monitored by our scanner and
our research team. The conversations were all initiated by
the counter-party via email, usually requesting further in-
formation or to be excluded from the scan. We answered
36 conversations in total, 14 of which requested certain IP
ranges to be permanently excluded. 1,798 /24 networks were
excluded as a result of these requests. 61% of all interested
parties which detected our scanning activity and contacted
us decided to allow the scan to continue. The geographi-
cal location of the counter-parties correlates closely to the
heat map in Figure 8. We did not receive any correspon-
dence from ISP organizations or organizations from Asia,
even though the majority of vulnerable devices were discov-
ered within such IP ranges.
5.5 Preliminary Longitudinal Results
Table 7 shows the preliminary results of our longitudinal
study. We retested 102,896 vulnerable embedded devices
discovered at the end of December, 2009. As of April 20,
2010, 54,429 of the retested devices are still publicly acces-
sible, out of which 52,661 devices remain vulnerable.
In other words, approximately 96.75% of accessible vul-
nerable devices are still vulnerable after a 4 month period,
and factory default credentials have been removed from only
3.25% of the same set of devices.
6. REMEDIATION STRATEGY
The least sophisticated attacker modeled in this exper-
iment can be defeated by simply discontinuing the use of
well-known default credentials on embedded devices. How-
ever, the overall cost of implementing this naive mitigation
strategy will likely be quite high in reality. In the unlikely
event that all embedded device manufacturers universally
agree to discontinue the use of well-known default passwords
henceforth, we are still faced with the challenge of retroac-
tively fixing the vulnerable legacy embedded devices in use
throughout the world today. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the embedded security threat will likely per-
sist and grow endemically for the near future. In order to
effectively reduce the total population of vulnerable embed-
ded devices in the wild, we must carefully consider the best
methods for securing existing legacy devices. Since exist-
ing devices are by definition under the administrative con-
trol of some individual or organization, successful mitigation
strategies must actively engage these network operators in
order to fix the problem.
According to the data presented in Section 5, a few groups
of network operators contribute disproportionally large num-
bers of vulnerable embedded devices to the global popula-
tion. For example, we discovered over 300,000 vulnerable
embedded devices operating in homogenous environments
within two ISP networks in Asia. Overall, embedded de-
vices operated by residential ISPs constitute over 68% of
the entire vulnerable population. Since ISPs centrally man-
age large numbers of vulnerable embedded devices, they are
the ideal candidates to engage to mitigate the embedded
security threat.
While immediately effective, engaging individual organi-
zations and manufacturers to fix pockets of vulnerable de-
vices can only impede the growth of the embedded security
threat but not solve it. In order to improve categorically the
security posture of both new and legacy embedded devices,
we must develop methods of delivering effective host-based
protection onto large numbers of proprietary embedded de-
vices running heterogeneous operating systems. We believe
that a novel, injectable code structure called Parasitic Em-
bedded Machines (PEM) [12] currently under development
by the Columbia Intrusion Detection Systems Lab provides
a viable solution to this challenging problem.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We presented the first quantitative measurement of em-
bedded device insecurity on a global scale as well as a pre-
liminary longitudinal study tracking vulnerable embedded
devices over a 4 month period. We developed an embed-
ded device default credential scanner capable of efficiently
and safely identifying vulnerable embedded devices on the
network. The scanner does this by testing whether one can
remotely login into a device using its well-known manufac-
turer supplied default credentials. Using this scanner, which
currently monitors 73 common embedded device types, we
identify over 540,000 publicly accessible vulnerable devices
in 144 countries. Vulnerable embedded devices were discov-
ered in 17,427 unique organizations on 6 continents including
government, ISP, private enterprise, educational and satel-
lite provider networks. Preliminary results from our longi-
tudinal study tracked 102,896 vulnerable devices discovered
in December 2009. Out of the 54,429 devices currently on-
line from the original population, 96.75% such devices still
remain vulnerable today. By breaking down the observed
vulnerable embedded device population across functional,
geographical and organizational categories, we were able to
identify key groups which contribute a disproportionately
large number of vulnerable devices to the global popula-
tion. Lastly, using observations derived from the presented
data, we proposed a set of realistic mitigation strategies to
effectively reduce the total population of vulnerable embed-
ded devices. This study demonstrates that there is a very
large population of trivially vulnerable embedded devices
available for exploitation by the least sophisticated adver-
sary. We posit that the size of this vulnerable population
can be significantly increased by escalating the level of so-
phistication of the assumed attacker. Since no widely avail-
able host-based defenses exist, vulnerable embedded devices
constitute a serious and pervasive security problem.
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